



Global Legislators Organisation for a  
Balanced Environment (GLOBE-EU)  
and  
Institute for Environmental Security (IES)



## **Greening Foreign and Security Policy: The Role of Europe**

### **First Draft Report of the GFSP Working Groups**

**1 December 2006**

*[Ed. Note: The following report brings together the first draft results of the four working groups in the Greening Foreign and Security Policy (GFSP) initiative. This compiled version does not yet attempt to fully integrate the separate reports, resolve any possible inconsistencies between them or sort out overlapping elements.*

*This “work in progress” document is for use by the working groups at their meetings in Brussels on 6 December and for discussion at the GFSP Conference on 7 December. On the basis of the results of those events and further input from working group members and conference participants, a second draft report is expected to be produced by the end of 2006. Following still further research and refinement of the initiative’s recommendations, a final report is to be produced in early 2007.*

*The draft working reports have been produced on the basis of input from the working group participants and further developed by the group coordinators and co-chairs. The drafts are not consensus documents; they do not necessarily reflect the views of all the participants in any group or all the groups. Moreover, participants may be taking part in the informal working groups in their individual capacities and not necessarily representing the views of their respective organisations.]*

### **Preface**

*[To be included in the Second Draft.]*

## Introduction

### The 1999 European Parliament Call for a Common Strategy

In January 1999, the European Parliament adopted a **Report and Resolution on Environment, Security and Foreign Affairs**.<sup>1</sup> The Theorin Report and Resolution focused especially on the impact of the military and war on the environment with respect to, for example, nuclear weapons testing and nuclear proliferation, chemical weapons, landmines, non-lethal weapons, etc. as well as the potential use of military resources to assist civilian endeavours to protect the environment.

However, the first operational paragraph of the Resolution had an even broader scope. Here the Parliament called upon the Commission to “present to the Council and Parliament a common strategy, as foreseen by the Amsterdam Treaty, which brings together the CFSP aspects of EU policy with its trade, aid, development and international environmental policies between 2000 and 2010 so as to tackle the following individual issues and the relationships between them:

- a) agricultural and food production and environmental degradation;
- b) water shortages and transfrontier water supply;
- c) deforestation and restoring carbon sinks;
- d) unemployment, underemployment and absolute poverty;
- e) sustainable development and climate change;
- f) deforestation, desertification and population growth;
- g) the link between all of the above and global warming and the humanitarian and environmental impact of increasingly extreme weather events.”

While there are references in EU foreign and security policies to linkages with environment and development concerns and there are important programmes and practices linking environment and development and even security in the overseas activities of the Commission – notably with respect to diamonds, water, forests and energy – to date, the Commission has not yet presented a proposal for a common strategy integrating the CFSP with environment and development policies as called for by the Parliament in 1999.

Since 1999, the EP also has taken further action regarding a number of specific situations where linkages exists between, for example, the management and exploitation of natural resources and conflict.

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<sup>1</sup> The report and resolution are available at:  
<http://www.envirosecurity.org/ges/TheorinReport14Jan1999.pdf> and  
<http://www.envirosecurity.org/ges/TheorinResolution28Jan1999.pdf>

## The GFSP Initiative

The Greening Foreign and Security Policy initiative was launched by GLOBE-EU and the IES at the [Symposium on Sustainable Development and Security](#) at the European Parliament on 31 May 2006.<sup>2</sup>

The aim of the symposium was to raise political issues with interested Members of the European Parliament related to improving the integration of environmental and development concerns, notably Climate Change, into the EU's existing Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security Strategy.

### The GFSP Working Groups<sup>3</sup>

Four working groups were set up to review current policies and best practices and seek to identify gaps in European and international policy and action with respect to four stages in the conflict cycle:

**Group A: Predicting Instability** - Monitoring, risk assessments and early warning in vulnerable areas and measures to avoid conflict.

**Group B: Preventing Conflict** - Policy instruments and measures for areas of escalating tensions and for conflict prevention (military and non-military).

**Group C: Building Peace** - Crisis management and resolution in the event of conflict (military and non-military).

**Group D: Recovery and Transition** - Post conflict restoration, reconstruction and structural adaptation.

The groups do not only focus on conflict related issues but also on predicting, preventing, and managing the impact of natural disasters as well as a number of other cross-cutting issues.

### Themes and Cross-Cutting Issues<sup>4</sup>

The groups are working to produce reports taking into account the relationships between:

- Environment and Development
  - Security and Development
  - Environment and Security
- ... and the interface among all three.

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<sup>2</sup> For the Summary Report of the Symposium go to : <http://www.envirosecurity.org/ges/symposium/>

<sup>3</sup> For more information about the GFSP Working Groups go to: <http://greening-european-security.blogspot.com/> The current list of participants in the groups is available at: [http://www.envirosecurity.org/ges/2-GFSP\\_LOP.pdf](http://www.envirosecurity.org/ges/2-GFSP_LOP.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> For more information on the themes and cross-cutting issues see: <http://www.envirosecurity.org/ges/>

Each report includes an introduction, an outline of key inter-related issues, examples of best practices and policy recommendations.

Key issues being addressed include:

- Mainstreaming Environmental Factors into EU Foreign Policy
- Mainstreaming of Conflict Prevention into EU Development Cooperation
- Civilian-Military Cooperation
- EU-US Cooperation
- Energy Security and Climate Security
- Relation to Other External Policies

### **Focus on Europe – Attention to the International Community**

Working especially with Members of the European Parliament, the aim is to promote the forging and implementation of an integrated strategy for environment, sustainable development and security of the European Union. In particular, the initiative advocates the better inclusion of environmental security aspects in the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Security Strategy and European Sustainable Development Strategy.

The working groups are endeavouring to produce recommendations which:

- Sufficiently address the environmental dimension of conflict and not just conflict in the more general sense
- Provide specific ideas for policy and practice going beyond the array of existing proposals generated in recent years
- Take into account existing positions and actions of the EU and propose new directions where the EU can especially make valuable contributions.

While the focus is on EU policies, programmes and practices, the initiative and the working groups are also paying very much attention to related developments within EU Member States, other governments, and other regional, inter-governmental and international organisations (such as NATO, OECD, OSCE, UNDP, UNEP, and the World Bank).

An overview of existing governmental and inter-governmental positions and actions dealing with the relationship between environment, security and sustainable development has been assembled in the **Inventory of Environment and Security Policies and Practices**.

The IESPP report is available at: <http://www.envirosecurity.org/ges/inventory/>

## **A: Predicting Instability**

### **Monitoring, early warning and risk assessments in vulnerable areas and measures to avoid conflict**

#### **1. Introduction**

This report focuses on three points: it describes the efforts of the EU and others regarding prediction of conflict/instability; if efforts integrate environment, security and development into foreign and security policy; and, if predictive methods are effective and being systematically utilized in policy and decision making. Recommendations to the EP will address the gaps in all three areas.

#### **1.1. The importance of predicting instability**

Predicting instability and state failures are important for several reasons. Prediction can be used in early action thus, preventing loss of natural resources, biodiversity and human lives, destruction of ecosystems, and disintegration of economies. In addition, awareness of and intervention in a potential conflict can be easier to resolve than one which has already evolved into conflict. Once a situation has evolved into conflict, the cost of conflict and post conflict operations will be exorbitant. While post conflict efforts are important, crisis management needs to take a more preventive approach which includes recognizing the root causes of conflict outbreaks and assessing or accurately modeling them with predictive tools.

**1.1.1** *Environmental factors cause instability, conflict and war.* Scholarly research demonstrates causal links between environmental scarcity & societal strife, migration, ethnic and economic tensions, and violent conflict<sup>1</sup>.

**1.1.2** *Environmental scarcity has three factors.* Environmental scarcity combines three main elements: (a) depletion of environmental resources, such as clean air, arable land, and clean water, as well as valuable natural/ non-renewable resources such as minerals or oil; (b) population growth; (c) unequal distribution of resources.

**1.1.3** Environmental scarcity is real and growing:

- There is irrefutable evidence of depletion of natural resources around the globe; see the latest report on human over-use of natural resources<sup>2</sup>
- Population growth is occurring in the under-developed and developing world – by definition those countries with the least capacity to invest in sustainable development of their populations and economies. These societies are often over-dependent upon a few key sources of economic wealth – often in environmentally intensive industries (mining, agriculture, oil).
- These same societies harbour severe income disparities between the few ‘haves’ and the many ‘have nots,’ exacerbating enduring economic, ethnic or environmental tensions.

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<sup>1</sup>Strategies for studying causation in complex ecological political systems, by Thomas Homer Dixon at <http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/eps/method/methods1.htm>. Also see work by Peter Gleik (on water resources) and Ronnie Lipschultz (on resource wars).

<sup>2</sup> [http://www.ourplanet.com/imgversn/footprint/living\\_planet\\_report.html](http://www.ourplanet.com/imgversn/footprint/living_planet_report.html)

- 1.1.4** *The industrialized countries are the source of much of the human-induced environmental threat today.* This is not to say that only the developing world witnesses environmental security threats: some of the most obvious threats to human health and the environment – pollution from factories, transport, oil spills, energy facilities – originates in the industrialized world. In fact, because the industrialized world produces proportionally so much more pollution / depletes proportionally so much more environmental resources than does the developing world, the former (including the EU) has a credibility gap in proscribing environmental protection regimes for the latter.
- 1.1.5** *It's about climate change – and a whole lot more.* There is much political focus on climate change at present, because of concerns raised by both the scientific community and certain political leaders (note Stern report, Gore film, Clinton global initiative to name but three<sup>3</sup>). However, some experts suggest that scarcities of cropland, water, forests and fish are of more immediate concern in their capability to disrupt society, and deserve urgent attention.
- 1.1.6** *Many governments are beginning to recognize the problem.* The security institutions of many OECD governments – including Finland, the UK, Canada, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland<sup>4</sup>, and at times the US – have noted the links between resource scarcity, poverty, and stability and proscribed preventive measures be taken to stabilize populations subject to these threats.
- 1.1.7** *The step after recognition is diagnosis – but today's intelligence community lacks an environmental security competency.* Currently most threats to national and international security are monitored by national intelligence agencies, which feed into the planning, procuring and training process (overall military preparedness). However, environmental concerns have not been fully integrated into intelligence & scenario-building, and thus are relatively absent from serious consideration in security planning. This is a major void that our effort is trying to identify and fill.
- 1.1.8** *Environmental security threats – like pollution – do not respect state borders.* Societal disruption emanating from environmental scarcity will be transient in nature. In other words: conflicts will not remain localized. Regardless of whether armed conflict breaks out, lack of basic resources will necessarily force victims to migrate. Migration of any significant size will easily upset social and economic structures, in the country affected, its neighbours, and those countries – like EU Member States – perceived as a potential refuge. In other words, the EU and the US may find themselves unanticipated recipients of environmental refugees. This is but one reason to build a robust predictive capacity.
- 1.1.9** *It's important to get the predictive modeling right. It's even more important to act on the outcome.* The nature of prevention means, by definition, that policy action should take place early, when these symptoms of environmental threats to security are identified – and before they precipitate full-blown crises. Thus a mechanism for early action is imperative. The difficulty of achieving early

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<sup>3</sup> In addition, a Climate Change and National Security assessment is expected in spring 2007 from a group of very senior former US military officials.

<sup>4</sup> “Introductory points regarding evolving approaches to environmental security,” draft discussion paper by Johanna Bernstein, Sept 12, 2006.

or preventive action should not be underestimated, however, as recent experience in both NATO and EU have shown.

- 1.1.10** Lack of early action, weakened governments in the affected states will have incentive to make choices contrary to the long-term interests of peace and stability. Countries experiencing chronic internal conflict because of environmental stress will likely fragment or become more authoritarian.<sup>5</sup> The resulting “out-migrations,” will pose a challenge for neighbouring and assisting states. The directly affected government, meanwhile, will struggle to both meet the governance challenge while being partially or totally disabled by the crisis itself. Weakened by its internal state, authoritarian regimes may be inclined to launch attacks against other countries to divert popular attention from internal stresses. Such situations – which have antecedents in recent history – should be the focus of serious security scholarship, policy and planning.
- 1.1.11** *The EU needs an institutional ombudsman to oversee its burgeoning environmental security capacity*, ensure it has the financial support, intellectual capital and political resources it needs, and help it evolve into a fundamental player in security, development and assistance policy making. The European Parliament should be at the core of this process, either acting as the ombudsman or appointing someone to this function.

## **1.2. The nature of predicting instability**

Instability for the purpose of the GFSP initiative refers to political instability as well instability caused by natural disasters as both can lead to conflict. In order to act early in either event, predictive tools are needed. Such methodologies can be in the form of monitoring, early warning systems, and risk and vulnerability assessments. These methodologies can be of a quantitative or a qualitative nature. They can also be based on past experiences and patterns or on analyses of the likelihood of certain future occurrences. Tools can predict for the short to long term and can be applied to regions experiencing different stages of conflict whether on the verge of outbreak or conflict or post conflict management. Prediction tools should be based on the understanding of the dynamics of conflicts and of the characteristics of the region being investigated. Needless to say, indicators used in predicting must be multisectoral as causes of conflict are diverse and related. Prediction assessments should be utilized in conflict prevention and crisis management not only to determine if there is high likelihood of conflict or not but also to determine the causes of the potential conflict in order to take a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention.

## **2. Current efforts in the field of predicting instability/conflict**

### **2.1. The European Union**

Under the auspices of the EU Program on Conflict Prevention, DG RELEX launched a check list for root causes of conflict<sup>6</sup>. The objectives of these root causes or early warning indicators are:

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<sup>5</sup> Thomas Homer Dixon, as cited.

<sup>6</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp/list.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp/list.htm)

- *to increase awareness within the EU decision making forums of the problems of those countries/regions with the highest assessed risk of an outbreak, continuation or re-emergence of conflict.*
- *to heighten the effort to ensure that EU policies (and in particular those managed by the European Commission)) contribute to conflict prevention/resolution.*

There are eight categories of indicators:

- *Legitimacy of the state*
- *Rule of law*
- *Respect for fundamental rights*
- *Civil society and media*
- *Relations between communities and dispute-solving mechanisms*
- *Sound economic management, (including the environment aspect)*
- *Social and regional inequalities*
- *Geopolitical situation, (also including a look at exploitation of natural resources)*

According to the EU there is a procedure in place for applying the indicators. Originally, the indicators were used in conflict assessments of 120 countries by EC desk officers and EC delegations. The countries receiving high scores are placed on a confidential ‘watch list’. This list is a snapshot in time and is subject to constant review. General Affairs and External Relations Council are notified of this list and the Commission keeps alert on developments in the countries. This EU checklist has been used by others such as agencies of the UN, donors and others working in the field of conflict prevention and peace building.

The Commission uses other tools for predicting conflict such as regular reports from delegations, open source information via the EC’s Crisis Room and ECHO’s disaster monitoring system called ICONS (Impending Crisis Online News System). The Commission also participates in surveying African countries in order to obtain information on root causes of conflict, EU leverage, and policy options.

## **2.2. The UN System**

The UNEP Division of Early Warning and Assessment (DEWA) aims to provide the world community with timely, scientifically credible, policy relevant environmental data and information for decision-making and action planning for sustainable human development. DEWA monitors, analyzes and reports on the state of the global environment, assesses trends and provide early warnings of emerging threats. DEWA has six regional offices, as well as an office at the UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre in Cambridge, UK. They work closely with a large number of partners and collaborating centres in all regions of the world and have established functional networks for data, information, assessment and capacity-building.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> UNEP Division of Early Warning and Assessment, [http://www.unep.org/DEWA/related\\_links/index.asp](http://www.unep.org/DEWA/related_links/index.asp)

The UNEP Project for Risk Evaluation, Vulnerability, Information and Early Warning (PreView) aims to identify risk and human vulnerability to natural hazards in relation with socio-economic and physical factors. They have developed an interactive graphic tool that enables prediction of natural disasters. Users can zoom in, add different layers of data, and use different backgrounds to highlight different components reflecting vulnerability.<sup>8</sup>

The United Nations System-wide Earthwatch is a broad UN initiative to coordinate, harmonize, and catalyze environmental observation activities among all UN agencies for integrated assessment purposes. They have a database of more than 300 environmental assessments.<sup>9</sup>

The UNEP Disaster Management Branch addresses immediate and long term human, social, health, economic and environmental impacts of natural and human-induced disasters, and aims to minimize the resulting environmental emergencies that they cause. Their approach is to promote disaster management in order to reduce vulnerability and enhance coping-mechanisms through capacity-building. They focus on: prevention; preparedness; assessment, response and mitigation; risk reduction; and mobilizing resources. They operate in collaboration with numerous agencies and have two units: The Environment Coordination Unit (ECU) and the Joint UNEP/Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Environment Unit. The joint effort serves to facilitate international response, multilateral coordination, assessment and to serve as a clearinghouse for information and maintain a 24-hour notification and alert system.<sup>10</sup>

### **2.3. State and Non-state Actors**

#### **United Kingdom**

The UK's Global Conflict Prevention Pool is an example of a "whole of government" approach to conflict prevention. In 2001, following a series of cross-cutting reviews to improve the UK Government's approach and effectiveness of conflict prevention activity across government departments, two conflict prevention pools were created (the Africa Pool and the Global Pool). These brought together the knowledge, skills and resources of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Department for International Development (DFID). Activities of the pools seek to harness the expertise available across a wide range of sectors, including development, security reform, public administration, good policing and justice reform. The Pools have helped the partner departments to work more closely together. They have also increased the impact of their work, bringing together the security and development aspects of conflict prevention, which must be included in conflict prevention strategies, if they are to lead to lasting peace and stability.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> UNEP Project for Risk Evaluation, Vulnerability, Information and Early Warning, <http://www.grid.unep.ch/activities/earlywarning/preview/>

<sup>9</sup> United Nations System-wide Earthwatch, <http://earthwatch.unep.net/>

<sup>10</sup> UNEP Disaster Management Branch, <http://www.unep.org/depi/programmes/emergencies.html>

<sup>11</sup> DFID, FCO, Ministry of Defense. "The Global Conflict Prevention Pool: A Joint UK Government Approach to Reducing Conflict". Undated.

## **Dutch Stability Assessment Framework<sup>12</sup>**

The Stability Assessment Framework (SAF) offers an analytical tool for stability analysis and strategic planning that helps develop the institutional capacities needed for an integrated policy response in a particular country. The SAF consists of several mapping and analysis exercises that provide input for policy-makers: a trend analysis of twelve important indicators for instability that will provide a comprehensive sketch of the situation and help identify priority concerns; an institutional analysis to highlight the effectiveness and legitimacy of major institutions such as the police, civil service, and the judiciary; a political actor analysis that includes the interests and activities of the main political actors in the country; and finally: a policy assessment outlining the past and ongoing activities of the organization conducting the SAF and of other international actors.

## **Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation's FAST programme<sup>13</sup>**

FAST International is an independent early warning program covering 20 countries/regions in Africa, Europe and Asia. The objective of FAST International is the early recognition of impending or potential crisis situations in order to prevent violent conflict. FAST uses 186 event types, covering human security and civil rights, crime and internal security, conflicts and violent actions, domestic politics, and social and political change, along with natural resources, environmental degradation, infrastructure, migration, ethnicity, and religion. FAST has established Local Information Networks consisting of local analysts (Field Monitors and Country Coordinators) to generate observations that are analyzed using integrated Event Data Analysis.

### **3. Limitations of Current Prediction Efforts**

#### **3.1. The European Union**

Despite the Commission's claim in using early warning indicators, integrating the 3 pillars of sustainable development and establishing a set of procedures for progressing from indicators to implementation, there are areas of the EU prediction process that need strengthening.

In an analysis of the key lessons learned, best practices and ongoing weaknesses of current EU cooperation in Uganda a number of recommendations were directed toward the EC on improvement of the conflict prevention strategy (includes prediction)<sup>14</sup>. Those issues and recommendations relating to prediction are summarized in this report.

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<sup>12</sup> Verstegen, Suzanne, van de Goor, Luc, de Zeeuw, Jeroen, "The Stability Assessment Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development." (2005) Clingendael Institute for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
[http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050200\\_cru\\_paper\\_stability.pdf#search=%22dutch%20stability%20assessment%20framework%22](http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050200_cru_paper_stability.pdf#search=%22dutch%20stability%20assessment%20framework%22)

<sup>13</sup> FAST International Early Warning Program. Swiss Peace Foundation. 2 Oct. 2006.  
<<http://www.swisspeace.org/fast/default.htm>>

<sup>14</sup> Sarah Bayne and Marie-Kristin Höbert (June 2006). Saferworld briefing paper: "Programming and implementation of the Country Strategy Paper for Uganda: Taking conflict into account".

The approach of the EC to addressing conflict in Uganda was described as not yet coherent and systematic. The EC focused on individual programmes and did not consider the impact all the sectors and a wider geographic area could have on the dynamics of the conflict.

The EC was criticized for not treating conflict prevention as a priority issue and for not integrating it as a cross cutting topic across all DGs.

The check list on root causes of conflict was described as being suitable only for general conflict assessment and not concrete project design.

It is mainly a desk based tool without an adequate methodology. One of the symptoms of this lack of depth is perhaps how prediction is treated as part of conflict prevention and not dealt with explicitly. *Moreover this framework does not foresee further in depth processes such as country studies on the field, maintaining local information and specialist analysis network. The list constitutes a useful instrument to raise awareness on conflict issues during the programming exercise (country strategy paper planning exercise). However it is not being used consistently. Firstly it constitutes a fairly recent tool and EC staff are not familiarised with it across all sectors. Due to frequent staff changes the desk officers do not have enough time – and it doesn't seem to be prioritised - to acquaint them with the issue of conflict prevention. Lack of human resources prevents the systematic consideration of the checklist across all sectors in the delegations as well as at the desks in Brussels. This is unfortunate, as the list could in particular be useful to raise awareness in sectors in which the staff is not yet sufficiently sensitized on this issue. Due to its general character the checklist is not made for, and indeed not being used, in the design of concrete projects or in the framework of budget/ sector support.*

*The EC also still needs to build its capacities and awareness on conflict prevention through training, innovative human resources policy and better information-sharing.*

### **3.2. Common Limitations of Current Prediction Efforts**

Assessments are not usually developed based on demand or on problem analysis in regions with risk of instability. Rather they are developed in ways determined by funding agencies that are normally external to the problems. After the assessments are developed then the experts sometimes attempt to link the tools with the problems in the area. Such an artificial link undoubtedly affects the accuracies and robustness of the models.

In the existing models, there are still improvements needed. The indicators or the process of selecting indicators for these assessments are not always clear or suitable for the event being measured. They are also often not adequately tested for accuracy or robustness and often they are not accurate or robust.

There are many assessments but none in practice are truly able to integrate environment, security and development for the prediction of instability. The focus is either on social and political factors or biophysical factors but not all three. It is important to understand conflict from the various perspectives but they cannot be dealt with in isolation of each other when predicting conflict which is multidimensional. There are rarely partnerships among these different sectors for

instance, those dealing with science, human rights and development. Often models are developed by foreign experts who are not in tuned with a comprehensive perspective of the problems on the ground.

Natural processes are complex and accurately modeling them is challenging. Traditional assessment methods have been increasingly taking on this complexity over the last 20 years in theory and conceptualization but the actual application have not caught up with the reality. To ensure that assessments are incorporating not only social and political factors but also the biophysical aspects of the environment is recognizably difficult. Furthermore, incorporating models and results into policy making and management processes is an even greater challenge.

## **4. Recommendations**

### **4.1. The EU Check list of root causes**

The EC needs to focus its efforts on obtaining a stronger conflict perspective in the various sectors as opposed to focusing on creating programmes for individual sectors.<sup>15</sup>

*Require systematic and qualified conflict analysis to be undertaken by implementing partners according to EC funding proposals- EC guidelines could specify that this needs to take into consideration identification of the conflict causes and drivers and how the project aims to ensure that it contributes to addressing these.*

*Give conflict analysis an equal priority to other forms of assessment i.e. integrate conflict analysis into established procedures (strategic plans, needs assessments etc.), as well as in terms of reference for implementing partners; to ensure involvement of all actors in the process and consideration of broader conflict issues (not only technical issues relating to sector-specific/project-specific needs).*

The European Commission should carry out an institutional review on how best to restructure its organization in order to ensure that early warning assessment is recognized as an important step in conflict management and must be mainstreamed into the decision making process.

The EC needs a well formulated method with clear procedures for using indicators and needs to understand the importance of addressing the diversity of sectoral issues that are identified as contributing to conflict as well as training in the dynamics of conflict and conflict prevention. The knowledge and awareness need to be embedded in the EC as opposed to being a subject matter for external consultants to address<sup>16</sup>.

Parliamentarians need to understand the cross cutting nature of the three concepts and the value of prediction assessments.

There are many prediction methodologies being developed and used today, some result in success and others not. The EP can draw from the myriad of assessment tools to improve its own prediction capacity by developing a method that allows in

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<sup>15</sup> Sarah Bayne and Marie-Kristin Höbert (June 2006). Saferworld briefing paper: “Programming and implementation of the Country Strategy Paper for Uganda: Taking conflict into account”.

<sup>16</sup> Sarah Bayne and Marie-Kristin Höbert (June 2006). Saferworld briefing paper: “Programming and implementation of the Country Strategy Paper for Uganda: Taking conflict into account”.

depth assessment and can be useful in concrete project design; and, by adequately integrating not only security and development indicators but environment indicators as well. It must be known first, however, what methods exist, how they work and how accurate they are in predicting instability. To solve this it is necessary to have a systematically and frequently updated comprehensive inventory of prediction assessment tools. There are already a few inventories made but they are not exhaustive or addressing instability caused by both natural and human factors or they are one off efforts. One example of a compilation of assessments can be found in the background paper by the UK's Prime Minister's Strategy Unit entitled *Countries at Risk of Instability: Practical Risk Assessment, Early Warning and Knowledge Management* (Yiu and Mabey, 2005). The list includes assessments from government, non government, academic and the private sector that target mainly the political and social aspects but not the environmental aspects.

It is recommended to the EP that to start up the task of improving its own capacity at predicting conflicts it can hold a competition where developers of prediction tools can register to win an award based on the effectiveness of their tools. The initiative should be promoted so as to attract many in the field and thus facilitate the initiation of an inventory of prediction tools. Experts, for instance, Jefferey Sachs and Richard Matthew can judge the competition for the best methods. The best tools can be used for implementing EU policy and the developers associated more closely with EU research organizations such as the proposed European Institute of Technology.

The EU Parliament cannot, however, be effective in its efforts if it stands alone. There needs to be concerted efforts by others such as the Commission, the Security Council, NATO, the United States, and the United Nations.

## **4.2. Other Recommendations**

Assessments need to be demand driven and developers need to work with the different sectors from the start in order to build models that can more accurately predict conflict.

At EU level only little efforts are made to assess existing prediction models and to promote their further development. There needs to be a policy that recognizes the importance of prediction and allows the support and necessary time for development and research.

The EP should spearhead the identification of an authoritative entity which would be responsible for various activities in the field of conflict prediction such as investigating more thoroughly appropriate indicators and developing methods for quality assessments, as well as updating the inventory and making information public through regular workshops and other communication means. This would facilitate others in understanding better and improving their predictive tools.

In addition to multisectoral input, it is important that assessments are built for or adapted to meet the nature of conflict in specific places. With local and multisectoral input the chances of understanding the situation and thus capturing the relevant variables are greater. It is therefore, recommended that the EP supports training of locals in potential conflict regions in the field of conflict prediction methodology development and conflict dynamics.

It is recommended that the EC work together with other expert organizations on improvement of the prediction tools. To do this the EU can support these

organizations by funding and promoting demand driven assessment development, as well as use its resources and experience to better define the objectives of comprehensive prediction assessments. As prediction and early action cost less than crisis management, funds to improve prediction methodologies can be reallocated from defence budgets which would otherwise be used in deploying peace keeping missions.

To ensure that the root causes of conflict, with a spatial nature, such as the environment are not excluded from instability predictive assessments and decision making, the EP should support efforts geared toward remote sensing monitoring. Specifically, this type of monitoring would be most effective in prediction and early action if it were to be done on a continuous basis for an indefinite period of time at the global scale, at resolutions appropriate for fire, erosion, land use and land cover change detection. Similar to the way some predictive tools regularly scan news sources around the world to calculate chances of conflict so too would the processing of images for early signs of environmental degradation contribute to conflict risk warnings. In addition, an expert body must be identified that would carry out the actual regular processing and monitoring. The efforts of this entity would need to be operationalized into the EU's conflict prevention programme. The objectives and activities of the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES), an EU initiative, are in line with this recommendation. It is recommended that the GMES takes on the responsibility of ensuring that such a system is established.

## **B: Preventing Conflict**

### **Policy instruments and measures for areas of escalating tensions and for conflict prevention (military and non-military)**

#### **1. Understanding the different dimensions of environmental conflict**

##### **1.1. The environment and security linkages**

Issues related to the environment can threaten global, national and human security. These include potential environmental changes associated with global warming, existing scarcities such as water and land shortages, and the management of natural resource assets such as hydrocarbons and forests. These factors can contribute directly to conflict, or can be linked to conflict by exacerbating other causes such as poverty, inequality, corruption, ethnic tensions, and disease.<sup>1</sup>

[Not all threats to environmental security are caused by armed conflict. Natural disasters may result in crises and tensions. Equally important are the tensions that arise from environmental pollution and environmental mismanagement, which do emanate from human induced conflict. In many cases, the impacts of natural disasters can often be exacerbated because of environmental mismanagement and other human factors, which may be quite distant from the actual physical site of the environmental crisis or conflict.]

When environmental changes cause rapid losses of income, the risk of conflict can grow considerably. A recent study by Edward Miguel and his colleagues at New York University found that, in Africa, a 5% drop in per capita income due to drought increases the likelihood of a civil conflict in the following year by nearly one half.<sup>2</sup>

##### **1.2. The natural resource curse**

Natural resources play a well-established role in fuelling and sustaining conflict, particularly in Africa. Research by the Oxford economist Paul Collier suggests that in any given five-year period the chance of civil war in an Africa country ranges from less than 1% in countries without resource wealth, to almost 25% in those with such wealth.<sup>3</sup>

The struggle for control over resources often serves as an explosive trigger for conflict, as is evident in the ongoing struggle over oil resources in the Niger Delta. After the outbreak of conflict, the illegal exploitation of resources sustains ongoing fighting. A notorious example here was the sale of “blood diamonds” and timber by Liberian former president Charles Taylor to finance conflict in Liberia and neighbouring Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. We have seen similar dynamics at play for many years in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where neighbouring states,

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<sup>1</sup> See “Environment and Security—The Role of the United Nations”, Roundtable Conference, 2 June 2004.

<sup>2</sup> Edward Miguel, “Stop Conflict Before It Starts”, *Business Week*, 18 September 2006

<sup>3</sup> Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler, *The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War* (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper, 2004).

rebel groups, and the government fight for control over the country's rich resources. The income streams that resources guarantee to the "victor" raise the stakes and make peace all the more elusive.

Africa is home to some of the best known resource related conflicts in the world today, but such conflicts are by no means limited to that continent. There are also resource related conflicts going on in Balochistan (Pakistan), Myanmar, Indonesia, Bolivia and elsewhere.

Natural resources can play a destabilising role even before the outbreak of armed conflict by providing incentives for large-scale corruption, and destabilising economies by creating a boom and bust environment. These dynamics have been evident for many years in cocoa and diamond rich Côte d'Ivoire for example, and directly contributed to the 2002 coup attempt and subsequent de facto partition of that country.

## **2. Policy Responses**

### **2.1. The cyclical nature of conflict**

Conflict is a cyclical process, in which each post-conflict environment contains the potential seeds of the next outbreak of violence. The countries and regions most likely to lapse into conflict are those that have experienced it before – in fact almost 50% of countries coming out of civil war fall back into conflict within five years.<sup>4</sup> The containment structures and capacities that need to be applied in a fragile state to prevent conflict from breaking out are essentially the same as those that need to be applied in a post-conflict environment to prevent violence recurring. There is therefore a great deal of overlap between the policy responses employed for the purposes of prevention and those used in reconstruction.

### **2.2. The case for investing in conflict prevention**

There is, however, a strong argument for devoting additional resources to conflict prevention. In addition to the clear moral case for acting earlier, there is a compelling financial argument. Prevention is comparatively cheap: the former UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw has estimated that the small preventive military deployment in Macedonia, stopping the slide to war there, cost the British taxpayer £14 million, while fighting the war in Kosovo, by contrast, cost Britain £200 million, and in Bosnia over £1.5 billion.

The economic cost of conflict dwarfs the amount the spent in any given year on global development. As noted in a recent UK Parliamentary Committee report,<sup>5</sup> a civil war in a low-income country could cost \$54bn (£29bn), while the worldwide aid budget in 2004 was \$78.6bn (£42bn). Multiply that by the many conflicts currently taking place, and the benefits of effective prevention, and the costs of inaction, are obvious.

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<sup>4</sup> [Add reference. Collier: Market for Civil War?]

<sup>5</sup> House of Commons International Development Committee, "Conflict and Development: Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction", 17 October 2006.

### **2.3. The importance of tailoring prevention responses**

There is no special recipe for dealing with environmental conflicts. It is important to tailor prevention responses to the underlying causes in each case, whether they involve resource scarcity, abundance, natural disasters, or environmental pollution. For the most part, the policies required to deal with conflicts relating to resource scarcity need to address the cause of the scarcity itself and the tensions that arise from competition for diminishing resources. Policies addressing the scarcity itself are, for the most part, beyond the scope of a paper on conflict prevention, dealing as they do with global warming, environmental destruction and sustainable development. Dealing with the tensions between groups resulting from resource competition is bread and butter work of conflict prevention efforts. Policies here should, among other things, be aimed at ensuring that there are legitimate and representative political channels through which parties can air and address their grievances. The policies required to deal with conflicts triggered or fueled by natural resources, are the similar to those required to generate sustainable development - namely transparency, promotion of good governance, effective rule of law, accountability, and empowerment of local communities.

Transparency undercuts corruption and supports efforts to promote good governance. It reduces incentives for illegality by devaluing the market for illicit products. The international community is slowly getting better at promoting transparency, and at pressuring recalcitrant governments to at least pay lip-service to openness - but there is a way to go.

### **2.4. Two important transparency initiatives**

There are two transparency initiatives that deserve particular attention: the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative for oil, gas and minerals (EITI), and the Kimberley Process for diamonds. Both processes proceed on the basis that secrecy and lack of data support corruption and illegality. The EITI effort seeks to defeat the “resource curse” by asking governments and companies to regularly publish details of all revenues and payments received by governments from those companies, and to submit to strict auditing of those revenues. Civil society groups and IFIs play a role in developing, implementing and monitoring the process. In a speech [earlier this year] in Abuja, British Chancellor Gordon Brown highlighted the importance of the EITI’s basic emphasis on government transparency in financial dealings with companies from the extractive industries. He also announced plans for a major expansion of EITI—not just encouraging the involvement of more countries and stricter implementation from existing members, but also the extension of this same simple transparency formula to other revenue streams.

The second initiative – the Kimberley Process – is focused entirely on the diamond industry, and involves an agreement between diamond-buying companies and both producer and buyer countries. Producer countries pledge to certify diamond shipments leaving their countries as “conflict-free”. In order to do this, they must first develop the means of tracking diamonds from mine to export. Buyer countries agree to only purchase diamonds that have been duly certified, and diamond companies allow individual purchasers of cut diamonds to buy only conflict-free diamonds by providing certification for each individual diamond. An effective mechanism for

reliably monitoring the process has yet to be fully established, and the measures currently in place will need to be substantially strengthened for the initiative to achieve its objectives of excluding conflict diamonds from the market place. We can apply the same principles to other industries, such as that for timber, in which the extraction and export of resources are currently subject to minimal scrutiny.

## **2.5. Threats to transparency efforts**

It is worth noting that positive developments on the transparency front are being threatened by the entry of China into many of these resource markets. China is now second only to the U.S. as an importer of African resources.<sup>6</sup> While the U.S and other Western countries and companies have often been lacking in transparency or accountability in their dealings in Africa, they have in recent years at least paid lip service to these values. However, China has made it clear that it does not believe in transparency or conditionality in its dealings in Africa– undermining efforts of other countries competing with it for the same resources.

## **2.6. Assessing the positive impacts of transparency initiatives**

It can be difficult to quantify the benefits of such transparency measures, but Paul Collier and his colleague Anke Hoeffler have made a valiant attempt to do so. In a 2004 paper, they looked at various conflict prevention interventions, including those relating to natural resources. They found that if the Kimberly Process could be extended to restrict rebels' access to other commodity markets, the global benefits could amount to some \$6 billion. The material, as opposed to political, cost is minimal. They also found that the EITI has benefits in reducing the risk of conflict starting in the first place, and in promoting faster economic growth. If applied to all extractive industries, they calculate the benefits total \$89 billion, again for little material cost. There are obviously a number of grand assumptions here, but at the very least this analysis does demonstrate that there is a substantial pay-off to dealing with the conflict resource issue. Such analysis should be an important part of the debate.

## **2.7. The good governance imperative**

Good governance and the rule of law means, among other things, addressing the incentives for corrupt behaviour. Post-conflict reconstruction in Liberia has been hampered by rampant corruption and misuse of funds. Under the terms of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (or GEMAP) being implemented by donor institutions and the Liberian government, strict controls are to be imposed on the collection and disbursement of government funds to ensure that this revenue reaches the central treasury. Transparency in the resources sector will be enhanced by subjecting government authorities to regular auditing. In particular, GEMAP seeks to bring accountability to forest revenues by means of a “chain of custody” tracking system run by a management contractor to track timber “from stump to export” and determine tax revenues accordingly. Success in these efforts would go some way to making Liberia economically self sufficient.

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<sup>6</sup> [Source:     ]

Good governance also means engaging civil society and local government structures in the process of resource management. If one of the ways in which resources trigger conflict is between central governments and resource-rich regions, it is essential that these regions have some role in how local resources are managed. Failure to do so leads to the kind of conflict we are seeing right now in the Niger Delta and Balochistan, where rebels are seeking to stop the government and resources companies from extracting the resources.

Another way to undercut the trade in conflict resources is to prosecute those who fund and sustain conflict by commercially engaging in such trade. One high profile case is the Dutch prosecution of the Oriental Timber Company. And when the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, first announced he was looking into the conflict in the Congo, he made it clear that he considered the prosecution of illegal business practices fuelling conflict there to be within his remit. The Special Court for Sierra Leone has also made reference to the exploitation of blood diamonds as a relevant factor in some of its prosecutions of those who committed atrocity crimes.

### **3. The EU's role in environmental conflict prevention**

#### **3.1. Introduction**

The following is a non-exhaustive overview of the range of environmental conflict prevention measures and approaches that the EU has developed in recent years. Many of these are directly related to environmental conflict per se, while others are not but which may prove useful in considering how the EU might build and strengthen its efforts (as further described in Section 3.2 below).

- The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) commits the EU to an integrated approach to conflict prevention and crisis management, as well as to other security threats (although its reference to environmental security threats could be stronger). The ESS recognizes that none of the new threats are purely military. It also acknowledges that the new generation of threats must be addressed by a combination of civilian and military instruments spanning the range of both development and security instruments in the framework of EU external action.
- The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which aims to bring the benefits of enlargement to its new neighbours, is another important new framework for conflict prevention in EU neighbouring countries, although the links between conflict and environmental degradation have not been routinely addressed in the ENP implementing tools such as National Action Plans.
- The EU's Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts aims at a more systematic and coordinated use of EU instruments (including environmental policy) to address the root causes of conflict. It has also catalysed an improvement in the development of Country and Regional Strategy Papers (the main EC aid programming tools) with Commission officials now required to assess a wider range of risk factors, including environmental degradation. The Commission's

geographical services use the “check-list of root causes of conflict” that has been developed in collaboration with the Conflict Prevention Network.

- The Commission now uses conflict prevention teams to assist the Commission’s geographical services to mainstream conflict prevention in aid programming. Multidisciplinary teams of independent experts with horizontal competence in a wide range of areas are deployed to assess potential conflict issues and to propose a medium-term conflict prevention strategy to be integrated into co-operation activities identified in the Country and Regional Strategy Papers.
- The Commission’s 2002 ‘Communication on Water Management in Developing Countries’ pays special attention to the role of water management mechanisms in conflict prevention.
- The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) is now fully operational and is being used to bring quickly a host of measures to bear on a conflict situation, which would previously have been subject to more cumbersome procedures. However, to date, RRM projects have focused only on political conflict.
- The European Community has been a participant in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme since its inception and the EC implements the Scheme through a Council Regulation applicable in all the Member States. The EC has been instrumental in setting up an effective monitoring system within the Scheme, and will chair the Kimberley Process in 2007.
- The EU Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) addresses the linkages between conflict timber and governance in the forest sector and introduces a licensing scheme to prohibit the import of illegally harvested timber within the EU.

**3.2. Recommendations for the EU** [*Section under review. The Working Group is considering shortening this section to focus more specifically on recommendations with direct relevance to environmental conflict.*]

**Recommendation One:**

***Ensure coherence between EU crisis management and long-term conflict prevention***

- Significant progress has been made by means of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in promoting stability in fragile and conflict-affected states. However ESDP implementation should place greater focus on strengthening the development and implementation of long-term strategic peacebuilding approaches and translating those into practice.
- [The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management and their Commission counterparts should work to strengthen the linkages between civil and military initiatives with the EU’s longer- term conflict prevention and development programmes, in order to ensure sustainable ESDP missions.]

## **Recommendation Two:**

***Strengthen efforts to ensure conflict-sensitive EU development policy and practice***  
*[To be reviewed. Recommendations should relate specifically to environmental aspects. The Working Group is considering how to refine, shorten or delete certain points.]*

- While the 2001 Gotéburg *EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts* underlined that development policy provides the ‘most powerful’ instrument at the Community’s disposal for treating the root causes of conflict and instability. There are further steps that the EU might take to strengthen its conflict sensitivity approaches to development programming. It is recommended that the EU undertake the following initiatives<sup>7</sup>.
  - (i) Deepen its own research efforts with partners in conflict zones to understand local contexts, issues and needs. In many cases, this will require more robust forms of conflict assessment that consider the economic, political drivers that fuel violent conflict;
  - (ii) Support global-level research on more effective development responses to conflict situations. This will necessarily involve identifying approaches that will redress the potentially conflict-generating impact of development;
  - (iii) Develop more appropriate and strategic approaches to environmental peacebuilding;
  - (iv) Bring together development and humanitarian aid agencies, governments and other donors to strategise on how to provide development assistance and aid in a conflict-sensitive and co-ordinated way;
  - (v) Provide technical support to development agencies on how to implement projects in a conflict-sensitive way that is tailored to their specific needs and methods of working. It is important in this context to link the conflict analysis with the programming cycle of planned interventions, and to develop a firm understanding of the potential negative impacts. Efforts must also be directed towards planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating development interventions in a conflict sensitive manner.

## **Recommendation Three:**

***Mainstream environmental conflict considerations into EDF programming***

- Many Country Strategy Papers (the primary aid vehicle under the Cotonou Agreement) in the past have neglected to address environmental considerations in

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<sup>7</sup> These recommendations build on those made by International Alert: see [http://www.international-alert.org/conflict\\_sensitivity/resource\\_pack/chapter\\_1\\_\\_265.pdf](http://www.international-alert.org/conflict_sensitivity/resource_pack/chapter_1__265.pdf)

their poverty reduction and economic growth efforts.

The EU is stepping up its efforts under the new 10<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (EDF) to ensure that CSP approval is conditioned upon the preparation of a Country Environmental Profile (CEP).

- However, the EU should especially call for the assessment of environmental conflict to be included in the CEPs of fragile or conflict-prone ACP states. This would necessarily require the development of new internal conflict indicators to be used in the development of the new CSPs to enable effective monitoring and assessment. Greater efforts are needed to mainstream conflict-environment-poverty linkages in the CSP, including in the CEP.
- While greater efforts should be directed towards mainstreaming conflict considerations into the CSPs of fragile states, at the same time, the EU must deepen its understanding of how partnership agreements themselves impact on peacebuilding and environmental conflict prevention processes.

#### **Recommendation Four:**

##### ***Mainstream environmental conflict concerns into ENP programming***

- *National Action Plans (NAPs)* under the EU Neighbourhood Policy should also be approved subject to proper assessment of environmental conflict potential and consideration of conflict prevention approaches relevant to the region.
- The EU should explicitly require environmental conflict prevention strategies as a priority for the NAPs in conflict-prone neighbourhood states. Key elements should include clear benchmarking to measure progress in the development of effective prevention approaches, including strengthened environmental governance systems, civil society engagement in environmental decision-making, transparency and accountability initiatives.

#### **Recommendation Five:**

##### ***Strengthen transparency efforts [To be elaborated.]***

- Develop and strengthen licensing systems that build on current initiatives like those for diamonds and timber. These need clear reporting guidelines, mechanism for independent monitoring and compliance. [*To be elaborated.*]
- Increase the focus on capacity building of host countries in the negotiation of extractive sector transparency agreements to improve revenue management, resource pricing, accounting, reporting and auditing. [*To be elaborated.*]
- Increase the resources available for the investigation of corrupt practices under the UN *Convention against Corruption* and the OECD's *Convention on combating*

*bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions. [To be elaborated referring to enhancing implementation with reference to FT article. ]*

- Strengthen the EITI and the IMF guide on resource revenue transparency. Ensure that Member States lead efforts to develop them into an International Extractive Security Transparency Agreement with common standards of revenue disclosure, independent monitoring and effective compliance measures. *[To be elaborated.]*

### **Recommendation Six:**

*Strengthen accountability mechanisms [To be elaborated.]*

- Develop robust and well funded criminal and civil mechanisms to hold companies accountable within their home jurisdictions when found complicit in violations of international humanitarian law, anti-corruption conventions, and UN mandated sanctions regimes. *[To be elaborated. (EU Environmental Liability directive).]*
- Strengthen the implementation of the OECD's *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises* by increasing the technical and fiscal resources of national contact points; by creating common, improved standards for the transparent examination of complaints and speedy resolution of disputes; and by using this process to provide explicit guidance to business about the scope of the Guidelines' human rights provisions.
- Pay closer attention to the 'resource curse', harmonizing aid policies with policies on governance, policies to protect poor countries from price shocks and policies to promote responsible foreign investment. *[To be elaborated with more on resource curse with recommendations tailored to the EU context.]*
- Work through the UN and other international fora to develop international agreements that establish clear and authoritative norms on the rights, responsibilities and liabilities of companies in weak and war-torn states
- Ensure that public procurement policies exclude illegal and conflict resources install time-limited bans (sin bins) on access to government procurement for companies that trade in illegal conflict resources.

### **Recommendation Seven:**

*Reinvigorate income stabilisation mechanisms [To be elaborated.]*

- Strengthen and reinvigorate income stabilization mechanisms that help environmentally-conflict-threatened areas manage and stabilize revenues from natural resources and aid. *[To be elaborated.]*
- Reinvigorate the debate on measures for commodity price stabilization, beginning with the IMF's Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility.

- When environmental factors such as poor weather lead to a large income drop in a fragile state, the international community should consider providing a short burst of aid to compensate for the losses, which otherwise may help generate recruits for rebel movements. [*Rephrase, using specific policy recommendation.*]

**Recommendation Eight:** [*To be reviewed.*]

***Develop environmental conflict prevention strategies for fragile states***

- Over 75 per cent of fragile states are conflict-affected, and the remaining 25 per cent are conflict-prone. [*Add reference, clarify terms and include data on the extent to which conflict in fragile states is related to the environment.*]

The EU must develop strategic peacebuilding approaches that address the root causes of state failure [and their links to environmental scarcity or degradation.]

- The EU must develop clear strategies to determine how its different policy instruments will work together to address environmental conflict prevention.
- The Council and Commission (with the Delegations) should draw up a list of key fragile states that are environmentally conflict prone and develop and implement new strategies that include: national and regional environmental peacebuilding assessments; mapping of existing initiatives and donor added value; broad-based consultations; framing of implementation mechanisms, resources and timeframes. [*The Working Group is considering whether to keep or delete this recommendation.*]
- A related recommendation includes expanding on the current approach used by the OSCE <sup>8</sup>, namely for the EU to encourage third countries to introduce and support the development of national, voluntary environmental conflict prevention reviews. This initiative would be based on existing well-developed analytical framework but which would be adapted towards identifying potential sources of environmental conflict. The process of “country reviews” has been well-established including OECD Economic Surveys, OECD Environmental Reviews and WTO Trade Policy Reviews, ECE Environmental Performance Reviews.

**Recommendation Nine:** [*To be reviewed.*]

***Promote good environmental governance***

- The links between good environmental governance and environmental conflict prevention have been well established.[*Add reference.*]
- EU policies and initiatives that encourage the rule of law, protect fundamental human rights, foster the growth of democratic institutions, promote accountable and transparent governance, support vibrant civil society engagement and develop

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<sup>8</sup>

<http://64.233.183.104/search?q=cache:0zQ6cOpCptwJ:www.unece.org/trans/osce/osceunece/EWM.pdf+Good+environmental+governance+and+environmental+conflict+prevention&hl=en&gl=be&ct=clnk&cd=8> .[*Add reference.*]

institutions for non-violent conflict resolution are also important environmental conflict prevention policies.

- The EU should enhance its efforts to assist third countries in strengthening institutional frameworks for sustainable development by:
  - (i) Promoting coherent and coordinated approaches to institutional frameworks for sustainable development at all national levels;
  - (ii) Developing national strategies for sustainable development that integrate economic, social, environmental and conflict aspects of sustainable development.
  - (iii) Enacting and enforcing clear and effective laws that support sustainable development and strengthening governmental institutions by providing necessary infrastructure and by promoting transparency, accountability and fair administrative and judicial institutions.
  - (iv) Promoting public participation, including through measures that provide access to information regarding legislation, regulations, activities, policies and programmes.
  - (v) Promoting the establishment or enhancement of sustainable development councils and/or coordination structures at the national level, including at the local level, in order to provide a high-level focus on sustainable development policies.
  - (vi) Enhancing the role and capacity of local authorities as well as stakeholders in implementing sustainable development agreements, including Agenda 21, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation.
- Encourage implementation of OECD Corruption Convention [*Add point that compliance needs to be improved in both developing and developed countries.*]
- The EU should promote effective implementation of the EU Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT). The 2004 action plan sets out an innovative approach for tackling illegal logging and links this approach to good governance in developing countries with the legal instruments and leverage offered by the EU's own internal market.
- In addition, the EU Green Diplomacy Network should be strengthened to address the challenge of integrating environmental conflict prevention challenges into external relations, especially as they relate to the key issues on the GDN agenda including climate change, biodiversity, land degradation and renewable energy.

### **Recommendation Ten:**

#### ***Strengthen Coherence***

- The EU should ensure better coherence and linkages between crisis management and longer-term civilian, development and peacebuilding programmes through strengthened joint assessment and planning across EU institutions. [*Add reference to International Alert*] [*Check for duplication.*]

- [The EU should also conduct an annual review of ‘coherence in external actions’ especially as regards linkages between security, governance, environment and development actions in fragile states. This review should be subject to the scrutiny of a joint committee composed of the European Parliament’s Development, Foreign, Defence and Budget Committees.] [*The Working Group is considering whether to keep or delete this recommendation.*]

## **C: Building Peace**

### **Crisis management and resolution in the event of conflict (military and non-military)**

#### **1. Introduction**

1.1. In her speech given at the British Embassy in Berlin in October, Margaret Beckett, Britain's Foreign Secretary, laid down a challenge to the EU foreign policy community :

“Climate change is a serious threat to international security. So achieving climate security must be at the core of foreign policy.”

1.2. Since the Maastricht Treaty, EU foreign and security policy have been inextricably linked. However in her speech, Beckett argued that the threat posed by climate change to international security does not constitute an alternative security agenda, but rather a broadening and deepening of the existing agenda. To that end the understanding of the security implications of climate change is essential to pursuing the EU's existing security agenda. As she herself said “Being a credible foreign minister means being serious about climate security”.

1.3. By putting climate change at the core of EU foreign and security policy, she poses a challenge to the EU defence community, as she herself acknowledged in reversing Bismarck's “iron and blood” dictum :

“Today I suggest that the exact opposite is true. The greatest security threat that we face as a global community won't be met by guns and tanks. It will be solved by investment in the emerging techniques of soft power – building avenues of trust and opportunity that will lead to a low-carbon economy. There is no backstop: politics and diplomacy have to work.”

1.4. Whether or not Margaret Beckett's vision of the future is realized in practice, she poses two distinct challenges to the defence community in general and the military establishment in particular: in the short term, what role if any should the military play in combating climate change and more particularly, will the role of the military deployed in the event of conflict be altered in any way by dint of the conflict being climate or more generally environmentally driven, as opposed to more traditional forms of conflict ?

1.5. In the much longer term, if Beckett's vision of the future does indeed come to pass and a world is created as a result of climate mitigation and adaptation where politics and diplomacy do work, will there still be a role for the military and if so, what should it be ?

1.6. Given its remit, these working group draft interim conclusions will concentrate on the first of those two questions. However, as was noted in the working group discussions, by the stage of the conflict at which the military are deployed, the EU's principal objective of conflict prevention will, by definition, have failed. By the same

token, if over a period of decades, the EU's strategy of conflict prevention turns out to succeed in practice, the "utility of force"<sup>1</sup> is bound to come into question.

## **2. Definitions**

2.1. For the benefits of this working group, peace-building was taken to be "all that is needed to help a country move from war to peace"<sup>2</sup>. It incorporates amongst other things:

- The establishment of a sustainable infrastructure of human security, which involves the putting in place of a minimal set of conditions under which a country can take charge of its destiny, and social, political, and economic development become possible.
- The building of legal and human rights institutions, as well as dispute resolution processes and systems.
- Support for reconciliation, institution-building and political, as well as economic, transformation.
- The use of environmental cooperation activities such as peace parks, shared river basin management plans, regional seas agreements, and joint environmental monitoring programmes to manage resources.

2.2. Non-military conflict was taken to refer to major emergencies (including natural and man-made disasters, technological, radiological and environmental accidents, acts of terrorism and accidental marine pollution). Within the EU, this is dealt with in depth by the EU Civil Protection Mechanism<sup>3</sup>, which facilitates cooperation in these types of interventions in the event of major emergencies and which require an urgent response.

## **3. Limitations**

3.1. By contrast to the remits of the other working groups, where a vast literature exists concerning risk assessment, conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction, the discipline covered by Working Group C is still in its infancy. The threat posed by global climate change was only formally recognized at the global level at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. The first major reports in response to this in terms of the security and defence implications of global climate change and environmental degradation more broadly, whether climate derived or otherwise, appeared only in 1999 : the European Parliament's Theorin Report, adopted in January 1999 and NATO's Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society's Report on Environment & Security, published in March 1999.

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<sup>1</sup> See Smith, Rupert, *The Utility of Force; The Art of War in the Modern World*; Allen Lane, 2005.

<sup>2</sup> UN Peacebuilding Commission ([www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding](http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding))

<sup>3</sup> Established by Council Decision on 23 October 2001, later recast in January 2006.

3.1. Since then, although more serious work has been published, not least by the Pentagon, not much has changed in practice. As NATO's 1999 Report put it :

“A comprehensive effort is thus needed to integrate environmental concerns into all other policy areas and relevant institutions and contexts in order to at least manage, if not prevent the security impacts of environmental stress.”

3.2. The very fact that Margaret Beckett felt the need to make her Berlin speech demonstrates that the necessary comprehensive effort has yet to become manifest. The initial deliberations of the working group very quickly unravelled the reason for this. For in attempting to answer the question of how the role of the military may need to be changed by the onset of climate insecurity, a series of issues will need to be resolved for which at present there are few if any well-worked out solutions. As a consequence, the draft interim conclusions of this working group are compelled to be of a very tentative nature, flagging up problem areas rather than proposing concrete solutions.

#### **4. Observations and Recommendations**

**4.1. Engagement with Local Communities.** Whilst this is a truism and has been an essential part of conflict management since even before the Malayan conflict, it has become increasingly important given that most conflicts are now fought amongst the population in which they take place. However, a post conflict scenario usually implies a degraded environment and therefore any sort of peace agreement should include environmental concerns especially if a potential dispute over natural resources<sup>4</sup> or environmental mismanagement can create a return to conflict<sup>5</sup>. There is also a need to identify the needs of special groups such as refugees and women.

**4.2. The Use of Force.** The main emphasis of the EU's approach to foreign and security policy is on conflict prevention and there is no reason to believe that would be any different for an environmentally driven conflict. However, it is the assumption of the working group that the “utility of force” will remain relevant for the foreseeable future to ensure that the EU still has the means to respond to a crisis in the event that

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<sup>4</sup> In the Aceh peace agreement, the title on “Economy” states that “Aceh will have jurisdiction over living natural resources in the territorial sea surrounding Aceh” and “Aceh is entitled to retain seventy (70) per cent of the revenues from all current and future hydrocarbon deposits and other natural resources in the territory of Aceh as well as in the territorial sea surrounding Aceh.” It is not clear if this distribution of natural resources will bring more stability to the region. (*Source – Aceh Peace Agreement*).

<sup>5</sup> The province of Aceh has a long tradition of resisting the Indonesian central government in Jakarta. This resistance began as a religious movement, but acquired a different tone once Mobil Oil Indonesia (MOI) discovered a vast wealth of oil and natural gas deposits in Lhok Seumawe, North Aceh in 1971. This discovery inspired the development of the Lhok Seumawe Industrial Zone (ZILS); an enclave devoted to oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) extraction for foreign export. While the ZILS has been lucrative for MOI (now Exxon Mobil Indonesia) and power brokers in Jakarta, the Acehnese have only experienced the zone's harmful side effects: environmental degradation, dislocation of indigenous families, significant inflows of migrant workers, and disruptions in their traditional livelihoods. These inequities led to the emergence of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), a separatist front determined to see Aceh become an independent and oil-rich sultanate. Exxon Mobil has attempted to present itself as a “neutral” player in the fight waged between Jakarta and the rebels, maintaining a somewhat false separation between business and “politics”. (*The Acehnese Resistance Movement and Exxon Mobil*, Jeremy Schanck. *ICE Case Studies*. Number 85, May, 2001)

the conflict prevention effort fails and the situation deteriorates. In these circumstances, the fact that a military response is called for will be irrespective of whether the conflict is environmentally driven or not, however, the specific application of that force may well differ.

a. The initial deliberations of the working group have revealed a number of issues specifically of relevance to the military aspects of any EU intervention resorting to the use of force which are nonetheless of relevance equally to the whole conduct of the EU's foreign and security policy as a whole, so are not specific to the conduct of individual operations. It should be stressed at the outset that, for many of these operations, there will be a fine dividing line, indeed, on occasions an overlap, between the military and the policing aspects of an operation, so there needs to be established close liaison between the EU's military and policing structures where the latter may be called upon for deployment in third countries (notably the EU Gendarmerie).

**4.3. Funding.** The EU budgetary process is notoriously cumbersome and complex and is even more so when it comes to military matters, as the Treaty requires decisions to be taken unanimously. When it comes to military operations proper, the situation is further complicated by the fact that each government has to pay the full costs of its own force deployments, which can be a huge disincentive for them to join in overseas operations which may appear far from the immediate national interest. But defence expenditure is a highly sensitive issue for all Member States and only Britain, France and Greece of the current Member States spend more than 2% of their national GDPs on defence spending.

a. As the EU budget is coming up for review in 2008/9, it would be particularly timely if, as a part of the ESS review, a debate could be launched as to the feasibility and even desirability of establishing a permanent strategic contingency reserve at the EU level which could meet, at least in part, the operational costs of crisis interventions.

b. There is also a need for flexibility of funding because the earmarking of funds by activity or geographical locations under complex emergency conditions is a major additional burden for the designers and managers of integrated programs. Furthermore funding must be adequate, continuous and have an environmental dimension. We would recommend special funding for development recovery.

**4.4. EU Capacity Building.** The NATO Report outlines the issue succinctly :

“The idea of an EIA for policies and programs might serve as an example for necessary comprehensive political assessment mechanisms that go beyond traditional policy measures to assess the socio-economic impacts of environmental change. Its principles and procedures should be extended to assess the impact of environmental stresses on social, political and economic conditions and on security. These comprehensive assessment mechanisms should be institutionalised and should be used at all levels of decision-making as a mandatory and routine procedure for integrating environmental considerations and security concerns related to environmental change.

Clearly, this integration process should extend beyond environmental institutions. ... This may include the establishment of institutions such as councils, departments, bureaux and officers for sustainable development that are to enforce the observance of agreed-upon principles of such development.<sup>6</sup>

a. This principle, however, equally applies in the reverse direction. If the monitoring and surveillance systems reveal the risk of conflict onset in a given set of circumstances in which military intervention may become a possibility, the integration of the military into the planning and decision-making structures will be essential if policy consistency is to be maintained during the conflict stage of the operation.

b. When the draft EU constitutional treaty was being negotiated, the integration of the environment into the EU's CFSP & ESDP decision-making structures did not form part of the debate. Given that the future of the draft EU constitutional treaty remains to be resolved, it remains possible to launch a discussion of how the military aspects of the integration of environment and security could be built in to the EU's future decision-making structures.

c. The European Parliament has called for the European Security Strategy to be reviewed in 2008 and emphasized the need to establish mechanisms effectively to "coordinate the civilian and military elements of the international community's response to a crisis" and endorsed the suggestion in the Barnier Report<sup>7</sup> of the creation of a European Civilian Security Council as one possible option for doing this.

d. At this stage of the political discussions, it would be premature for the working group to recommend whether this or the option of upgrading of the Civilian and Military Cell and the Operations Centre into a European Headquarters for carrying out civil-military missions should be the preferred route, or maybe both, but it is essential that the environmental-military element is built into these structures from the outset.

**4.5. EU Capabilities.** Since the Helsinki Summit in 1999, there has been much debate about EU military (and since the Nice Summit, civilian) capabilities, but far less to show for it, at least on the military side. The original "headline goal" of creating an EU military force of some 60,000 deployable within 60 days for the duration of at least one year appears to have been all but abandoned, at least for the foreseeable future. Although such a force was to have been capable of carrying out the full range of so-called Petersburg tasks, the specific missions authorized in the Treaties, there has always been some doubt as to how it was to be used in practice, being too small for an Iraq-type operation but much larger than most multinational operations deployed in recent years. The creation of thirteen "battle-groups" that EU Member States are currently committed to setting up would appear to be much more appropriate to the likely range of tasks for the years ahead, so long as they are genuinely modular. However, it remains to be seen how these battle-groups would be deployed as opposed to, for example, the NATO Response Force.

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<sup>6</sup> NATO; Report by the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society's Report on Environment & Security. March 1999

<sup>7</sup> On a European Civil Protection Force: Europe Aid. May 2006.

a. However, the real question about EU capabilities as far as environment-linked crises is what the deployed forces are actually capable of doing when they get to their destination. One of the key issues to emerge from the working group's deliberations was that in the event of extremely intense conflict, many if not most civilian experts would be compelled to leave the conflict zone, but historically, military personnel would not be adequately trained or equipped to take on their role in their absence. As we are seeing in Iraq and Afghanistan today, that situation can endure well past the conflict phase proper. The question therefore arises to what extent should the military have at least core expertise in these specialist areas and the equipment necessary to carry them out, or whether they should be contracted out to adequately "robust" non-military units, and in either case, how these should inter-relate to the NGO's and other civilian organizations that traditionally fulfil these roles.

b. From this it follows logically that the European Defence Agency may need to review its research and procurement priorities to reflect the equipment needs, whether used by military or civilian personnel, for future EU-led intervention operations to ensure that EU personnel deployed on such missions have both appropriate and adequate equipment in order to fulfil their designated tasks.

**4.6. Integration of Military and Civilian Approaches.** Military approaches to peacebuilding should be fully integrated with the advice and initiatives of political, humanitarian, and human rights and development specialists. Civilian staff must be trained to enable them to take over after the departure of military. The best practices of both the military and the civilian staff should be used. It must also be ensured that public information is formulated by an integrated team and that it is sole basis for information initiatives.

a. But does this integration go far enough to be effective in dealing with future threats? The Working Group believes that consideration needs to go into an agency which incorporates parts of the defence, customs, intelligence, and overseas aid departments and agencies to form a tool which can deal effectively with them. Furthermore given the vagaries of domestic politics, consideration should be given to the integration of the private sector into all aspects of these types of intervention so that opportunities are not missed when the political will is lacking.

b. Peacekeeping troops must be prepared to work in a degraded environment, with usually lower environmental protection standards. There is a need to include a Rapid Environmental and Health Risk Assessment in the teams deployed in the field to assess which threats need to be tackled first and which resources need to be secured.

c. Decisions based on environmental protection measures can bring social unrest and instability. In a post-conflict scenario environmental concerns must be considered always in connection to peace-building efforts<sup>8</sup>.

**4.7. Legal Authority.** The deliberations within the working group revealed the difficulty in making sure that military personnel deployed on missions in third countries have adequate and appropriate legal authority to perform the tasks that they are called upon to do. This is a complicated area, involving status of forces agreements and rules of engagement and is not made any easier by the fact that, in the absence of the EU draft constitutional treaty, the EU itself does not have legal personality. The example was cited of how EU soldiers could be required to enforce illegal logging rules in a given developing country if they are not given specific legal authority to act in this way in their authorizing mandate. This is clearly one which requires much further reflection and discussion, but is of great importance to the military themselves.

**4.8. Rebuilding the Civic Space.** Civil society is the backbone of a sustainable political system. This means that the revival of civic activities (sports, business, professional, etc) and associations must be supported as this is a major step in the reconciliation process of war-torn societies. Multiple bridges must be built across lines of conflict. A safe “political space” must be designed and created for these civic programs so as to eliminate intimidation.

a. Means of a public forum/media outlet should be established (as in radio transmissions) and local actors must be involved in the formulation of the messages. There is also a need for special environmental messages to address such issues through the media.

b. There is a requirement for an environmental policing system to prevent illegal export of environmental goods and combat the dangers of corruption, illegal shipment of waste and environmental crime. Police forces deployed in the field must have appropriate knowledge of environmental protection legislation and enforcement. The lack of rule of law in a post-conflict scenario might lead to the depletion of natural resources, and spreading of environmental crime, usually affecting the weakest population groups (minorities, refugees, displaced people) that cannot or do not know how to protect their rights.

c. The training of local Police officers must include environmental crime and environmental protection modules. The OSCE Police Academies can serve as an example for setting Police training facilities.

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<sup>8</sup> The Zvecan TREPČA mining complex was shut down by UNMIK authorities with KFOR support on August 1999, citing the environmental and health hazard, and placed the Zvecan complex under UNMIK administration. To minimize the political costs, 1,000 Serbian employees retained their employment at UNMIK expense for cleaning up works, while the remaining 2,200-2,500 Serbian workers were given stipends. Compared with earning at Zvecan in 1999, the UNMIK rate was very generous. Already in 1990, an estimated 25,000 of sulphur were being discharged into the air as sulphur dioxide. Lead levels in the air rose to about 125 times acceptable European Union standards. Trepča managers persistently denied the existence of pollution for fear of UNMIK closing the plant. (Source - *Trepča, 1965-2000, A report to LLA by Michael Palairt, Reader in European Economic History, University of Edinburgh, U.K*)

**4.9. Engage development partners.** Development partners, particularly those with specific developmental expertise in sustainable development, are most likely to be the closest links to local populations, and they are an underutilized source of advice, ideas, knowledge, experience and commitment that would benefit peace operations as a whole.

a. Protection and recovery of natural resources and protection of environmental governance needs to be a priority as well as the establishment of a legal framework to protect the environment for private companies.

b. There needs to be better interaction of military and civilian operations and this can be achieved by joint operational planning. Joint training which includes aid and development agencies would also be effective. The OSCE Operations Unit<sup>9</sup> could provide expertise on field operations deployment.

**4.10. Strengthen Conflict Management.** Political powers must be mobilised at an early stage in order to manage armed conflicts and respond to natural disasters. International crisis management efforts must also be improved. This will require improved cooperation in the field between civilians and military actors, as well as a smoother transition from peace-support to peace-building operations, from emergency crisis-management to long-term post conflict reconstruction. Here, the EU's experience in coordinating civilian and military operations is instructive for OECD Member States.

a. Cross community projects are often an underutilised means of ensuring a smooth transition from conflict to post conflict and should be given more prominence. There is also a need to integrate environmental aspects into DDR processes.

b. A good model of strengthen conflict management capabilities is the UK's Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU). Established at the end of 2004 as a tri-departmental Unit of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the PCRU mission is to provide integrated and common assessments and plans to determine essential stabilisation needs and priorities; operational capability to deploy staff at short notice for a time limited period to a country identified for stabilisation support; and an evaluation of key stabilisation lesson learning.

**4.11. Ensure Accurate Assessments of Peacebuilding Efforts.** The assessments must draw on all relevant information, including from development cooperation agencies on the ground. These assessments should deepen understanding of the underlying causes that contributed to the conflict in the first place, and which may present continuing risks to peacebuilding efforts. Local political dynamics must be

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<sup>9</sup> The Operations Unit in the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre acts as the primary point of co-ordination for operational planning within the OSCE Secretariat. The Unit provides the framework for the initial build-up and management of future field deployments, enhancements, downsizings and closures. It also ensures close co-ordination with international partner organizations on issues directly linked to operational activities.

understood to ensure that peacebuilding efforts can be regularly adjusted to local circumstances.

**4.12. Training.** In general, military personnel are trained to fight wars which is not necessarily the most appropriate form of training for the range of more humanitarian missions which future EU operations may involve. There is a debate about whether military personnel should be expected to perform essentially humanitarian or quasi-policing tasks, but in the event that they are, manifestly they need to have the most appropriate training for these tasks. Whether this is left to the Member States or should be in accordance with a more common European approach is the subject of considerable debate, as yet unresolved.

a. It is nonetheless also true that within the ranks of the military (and the emergency civilian services) there is a wide range of specialist skills and capabilities which could well be extremely useful beyond the confines of more traditional military tasks. Where particular skill gaps are identified, particularly as concerns climate abatement in developing countries, it may be more cost effective to fill them by outsourcing the skilled personnel rather than training “in-house” military personnel in those particular specialities. On the other hand, in the event of a particularly high intensity conflict, these outsourced personnel may need to be embedded within the military for their own security, which in turn may raise a range of practical difficulties.

## **D: Recovery and Transition**

### **Post conflict restoration, reconstruction and structural adaptation**

#### **1. Introduction**

1.1. The cost of post-conflict reconstruction is very high. It is estimated that more than half of the annual ODA - 156 billion euros - is spent on post-conflict reconstruction. [Recent reports estimate the average cost of each [post] conflict [situation] to be around 56 billion sterling pounds (82 billion euros)<sup>1</sup>.] [This is on top of the costs of the conflicts themselves.]<sup>2</sup>

1.2. Post-conflict situation is a crucial phase. There is high risk that countries emerging from conflict will fall back into war and violence. 'Typically there is 39% risk that a peace will collapse within the first five years, and a 32% risk that it will collapse in the next five years' (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004)<sup>3</sup>

1.3. These facts not only underscore once more that conflict prevention is the priority, it also calls for careful planning and implementation of post-conflict recovery measures and policies towards a sustainable peace.

1.4. This report provides some recommendations on how to integrate the environment into post conflict restoration, reconstruction and structural adaptation, taking into account the nexus of environment, development and security

[1.5. It is also wise to acknowledge that we cannot take a cookie cutter approach, but we will try to look at the common elements in a response framework.]

[1.6. Complexity of post conflict situations is similar to that of conflicts. Each conflict has its own set of causes and consequences. The complexity of conflicts and post-conflicts prioritises the importance of further research on these two areas and the typology.]

1.7. Every conflict has environmental impacts and dimensions, but these are often not identified as such nor prioritised by the international community. The environmental dimension of a post-conflict situation will only be taken into account when risks to human health, livelihoods and ecosystem services can be clearly demonstrated.

1.8. Most actors of the international community involved in post-conflict work seem to share common views on the need to address environmental aspects; it looks though as if it is not always clear how this can be done. Important work is being done, multilaterally as well as bilaterally. [*Elaborate.*]

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<sup>1</sup> [Reference... ]

<sup>2</sup> [The cost of war is inarguably very high. For example, the cost of US military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq - until February 2006 - reached 440 billion US dollars (336 billion euros)<sup>2</sup>. The cost of UK military and peace-keeping operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is estimated to be more than 5 billion sterling pounds<sup>2</sup> ([ ]billion euros). On average, as recent reports estimate, each conflict could cost around 56 billion sterling pounds (82 billion euros).]

<sup>3</sup> <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/pdfs/IPA-PostConflictEconomicRecovery.pdf>

**2. Cases of Interrelated Issues** [*This section should explain more on the interrelations between environment and development, development and security, and environment and security.*]

### **2.1. Environmental impact of war**

War has an enormous effect on humans and on natural environment. The environmental damages of armed conflict range from the ‘intentional destruction of fields or forests to denying enemy forces access to water, food, feed, construction material’ and shelter to ‘the manipulation of the natural and built environment for hostile military purposes’. The advancement of military technology also means the possibility of severe effects on the environment if biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons are used. (See Renner, IESPP Report, 2006).

### **2.2. Assessment**

Assessing the effects of conflicts is the first step for sound relief and rehabilitation efforts.

In post-conflict situations where natural resources are part of the conflict, the assessment becomes more important in analysing the role of exploiting natural resources in triggering the conflict. Natural resource dependence is one among other factors that would lead to conflict relapse (see Collier, 2006).

Current efforts in environmental impact assessment of wars and conflicts are chiefly led by UNEP’s Post-conflict Branch (PCoB). (See below.)

### **2.3. Rehabilitation**

Post-conflict rehabilitation tends to be focused on humanitarian consequences and reconstruction with only a secondary emphasis placed on environmental impacts. Environmental priorities are only elevated in importance when the environmental impacts can be explained in terms of their human health linkages.

The environment has to be integrated both in the humanitarian and reconstruction phases of post-conflict international efforts. In the humanitarian phase, it is important to ensure that local populations are protected from the health effects resulting from post-conflict environment pollution. Similarly, environmental concerns must be integrated into the reconstruction phase and this is best achieved through environmental impact assessments of all reconstruction projects and programmes, especially in the development of energy and transport infrastructure

Restoring the environment should also be considered as a vital element in restoring the livelihood of people affected by conflict. Of course, in post-conflict environmental situation, the poor are the most vulnerable to environmental degradation. Whether in the ‘drying of wells, desertification, unsustainable water management or coastal pollution, the income and daily food production of the poor people is most immediately impacted by resource degradation or scarcity’. Therefore, and in many countries, restoring the lives of the poor population depends largely on a clean and healthy

environment, from which sustainable livelihoods can be pursued. (See Pekaa Havisto presentation in EP Symposium<sup>4</sup>)

#### **2.4. Institution and State Building**

Conflict and post-conflict states are by default fragile states. In almost all the cases, countries that emerge from conflict are fragile and weak states and have incompetent governance structure. The EU Security Strategy (2005) contends this issue and mentions clearly that ‘state failure is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability’.

It is important to build strong state institutions and capable administrations after the conflict has been resolved – including environmental administrations - so that post-conflict countries will be able to manage their own environmental challenges. The role of the multilateral and donor community should be only seen as a supporter for state-building rather than a builder of state authority and administration.

‘In countries like Afghanistan or Liberia, which were very fragmented after the conflict, it was important that the new post-conflict governments regained control and planning over natural resources to ensure that they were not exploited anew in order to finance new conflict. One of the first steps in a post-conflict reconstruction process is to establish a central environmental authority and empower it with the authority to enforce environmental regulatory frameworks.’

#### **2.5. Environment and development - Vulnerable Groups**

It is often that the poorest of the poor, women and other vulnerable groups loose from the environmental damages of conflict. Post-conflict reconstruction efforts must also focus on actions to eradicate poverty, injustice, and inequality and must ensure that the vulnerable groups are targeted in its projects and programmes.

#### **2.6. Environmental impacts of reconstruction**

War-related destruction generates serious effects on environment including solid-waste, air pollution and water contamination. Enormous amounts of solid waste and debris are generated when clearing the destruction and in the reconstruction stages. With lack or ineffectiveness of environmental administrations in post-conflict countries, it is likely that waste and debris will be poorly managed exacerbating environmental problems<sup>5</sup>.

Even when a given conflict has not been fuelled by environmental factors, post-conflict environmental degradation may constitute an additional source of insecurity; the integration of the environmental dimension in post-conflict restoration is indeed a means to prevent future conflicts.

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<sup>4</sup> Summary Report of the GLOBE-EU / IES Symposium on Sustainable Development and Security, 31 May 2006. <http://www.envirosecurity.org/ges/symposium/SDSSymposiumSummaryReport.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> See environmental impact of the July 2006 war in Lebanon, UNEP - Forthcoming

### 3. Current response and best practices in post-conflict recovery

The following is an overview of a number of EU, international and national agencies and initiatives focusing on the post-conflict rehabilitation and recovery. (See also IESPP report published by IES, 2006<sup>6</sup>).

#### 3.1. The Role of the European Union

A number of important policies and initiatives of the EU are outlined below. What the EU needs is a post-conflict policy which better integrates environment at the EU policy, programme and project level. In particular environment and security aspects could be more specifically elaborated in the European Common Foreign and Security Policies (CFSP), in EU development cooperation policy, and in the Regional and Country Strategy Papers / Regional and Country Environment Papers.

In particular the EU could explore:

- The need for policy convergence between EU and member states with a coordination structure. One area to explore is the Regional and Country Strategy Papers and Country Environmental Profiles.
- The need for environment to be treated as a cross-cutting issue and at the same time as a separate sector.
- The possibilities for the EU to make good use of its leverage especially in setting conditions for multi-donor trust fund and in screening of software and hardware projects.

Some of the initiatives of the EU which are particularly relevant to environmental aspects of post-conflict recovery and transition are the following:

- **EU Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT)**<sup>7</sup>

To build on a commitment taken at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, in May 2003 the Commission published an EU Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT)<sup>8</sup>. Council Conclusions were adopted in October 2003, and the European Parliament motion on the FLEGT action plan was adopted in February 2004.

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<sup>6</sup> This listing is drawn from the *Inventory of Environment and Security Policies and Practices: (IESPP): An Overview of Strategies and Initiatives of Selected Governments, International Organisations and Inter-Governmental Organisations*, IES, The Hague, 2006. See:

<http://www.envirosecurity.org/ges/inventory/>

<sup>7</sup> Source: [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/theme/forest/initiative/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/theme/forest/initiative/index_en.htm)

<sup>8</sup> Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament -- Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Proposal for an EU Action Plan: COM (2003) 251 final:

[http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/theme/forest/initiative/docs/Doc1-FLEGT\\_en.pdf#zoom=100](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/theme/forest/initiative/docs/Doc1-FLEGT_en.pdf#zoom=100)

Illegal logging is responsible for vast environmental damage in developing countries, and impoverishes rural communities which depend on forest products for a living. Illegal logging costs governments in developing countries of an estimated €10-15bn every year in lost revenue. It is also closely associated with corruption, and serves to fuel the cycle of bribery and graft which does so much to curtail growth and prosperity in the developing world.

The Action Plan sets out a new and innovative approach to tackling illegal logging, which links the push for good governance in developing countries with the legal instruments and leverage offered by the EU's own internal market.

#### ▪ **EU Energy Initiative for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development<sup>9</sup>**

Access to modern and affordable energy services is a prerequisite for achieving the Millennium Development Goals, in particular for poverty eradication. The EU Energy Initiative for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development (EUEI) was launched at the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg as a joint commitment by the EU Member States and the Commission to give priority to the important role of energy in poverty alleviation, and is a catalyst for action.

The Initiative will raise *political awareness* among high level decision makers, encourage the *coherence and synergy* of energy-related activities and attract *new resources* (capital, technology, human resources) from the private sector, financial institutions, civil society and end-users. The Initiative is a framework for policy dialogue with Developing Countries and other partners, and also for specific actions and partnerships, supported by the Commission and Member States, and developed in close collaboration with Developing Countries.

Through the Initiative, the EU proposes to work with developing countries towards creating the necessary conditions in the energy sector to achieve their national economic, social and environmental objectives, in particular by maximising energy efficiency, including more efficient use of fossil fuels and traditional biomass, and increasing the use of renewable energy.

#### ▪ **Environmental Mainstreaming in EC Development Cooperation**

The programme phase of EC development cooperation is crucial for environmental integration because key decisions concerning the overall co-operation process are made that can be difficult to adjust in later phases. The main environmental integration tool during programming is the **Country Environmental Profile (CEP)**.

The CEP is a report that includes the analysis of the country's environmental situation, current policies, institutional capacities and environmental co-operation experience with clear recommendations for the integration of the environment during preparation of the **Country Strategy Paper (CSP)** for a beneficiary country.

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<sup>9</sup> Source: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/theme/energy/initiative/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/theme/energy/initiative/index_en.htm)

The **Country and Regional Strategy Papers** outline policy priorities. Also important are the **Check-List for Root Causes of Conflict** and the continually revised **Watch List of Priority Countries** (countries where there is a serious risk of conflict).

The CSPs and RSPs are or can be particularly important with regard to the linkages between development and security concerns. Before the end of the preparation of a CSP, the EC staff in each beneficiary country is required to undertake - or contract consultants to undertake - a Country Environmental Profile (CEP) which brings in the environmental dimensions.

A “tool box” with detailed guidelines on preparing Country Environmental Profiles (CEPs) and Regional Environmental Profiles (REPs) and other support resources, including links to official documents and institutions of the EU and to a variety of information on the relationship between environment and development are provided for EC staff on the **Environmental Mainstreaming in EC Development Cooperation Support and Resource Portal** at <http://www.environment-integration.org/EN/index.php>

#### ▪ **EC Study on Inter-linkages between Natural Resources Management and Conflict**

Most recently, the European Commission has begun to carry out a study “addressing the inter-linkages between natural resources management and conflict in the European Commission’s external relations”. The results of the study are expected in early 2007. The overall objective of the project is to enable the European Commission to formulate informed policy responses for a more coherent and comprehensive external relations approach to potential conflict threats arising from particular patterns of natural resource management. The study will therefore provide clear recommendations on how existing and future policies should better address the links between natural resource management and conflict.

More particularly, the project is intended to

- . **promote a better understanding** of the inter-linkages between natural resources management and conflict;
- . **increase the transparency and coherence** of relevant COM action, by assessing how these inter-linkages are currently integrated and/or could be better mainstreamed in COM policies;
- **contribute to a more comprehensive Commission response strategy** by pinpointing areas that may not yet have received adequate attention;
- **propose specific means to enhance the visibility and external credibility** of relevant COM activities;
- . **identify the unexplored potentials of existing external partnerships and examine the scope for future external synergies.**

### **3.2. The Role of the United Nations**

#### ▪ **UNEP Post Conflict Branch**

PCoB is one of the leading agencies that look at the environmental consequences and the related economic and social implications of war and conflict, identification of

hotspots accompanied with mitigation strategies, and in some cases, remediation. Once a post-conflict nation requests an environmental assessment of conflict, PCoB's undertakes an assessment that involves: initial investigations to assess the specific human and environmental risks; providing recommendations for effective reconstruction; building local capacity through training programmes; mobilizing international support through cooperation with humanitarian as well as environmental institutions to ensure that environmental considerations are incorporated into rebuilding processes.

- **UN Peacebuilding Commission**<sup>10</sup>

The Peacebuilding Commission will marshal resources at the disposal of the international community to advise and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict recovery, focusing attention on reconstruction, institution-building and sustainable development, in countries emerging from conflict.

### **3.3. The Role of The World Bank**

- **World Bank's Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit**

Several of the World Bank programmes and initiatives address the issues of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. The **Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit** is the main body that provides guidance on integrating conflict-related issues into World Bank activities. The Unit's activities include:

- conflict analysis aimed at optimising policy and project design in conflict-affected countries,
- developing specific tools and strategies to contribute to development in those countries, and
- supporting research on the economic causes and consequences of conflict.

The Unit has developed a **Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF)** that would address the complexity of the links between conflict and development programming. The CAF is a grading system for assessing projects, which may negatively impact on countries that are conflict-prone. It is composed of six categories of variables covering factors that have shown to affect or be affected by conflict,

One of the recent tools the Unit has prepared was a guidance note on possible approaches to the Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment (SEAs) in conflict-affected countries prepared by the Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment to prepare.

Three pre-conditions were identified for ensuring the success of SEAs in conflict zones. First, there must be the possibility of mainstreaming environmental issues into a strategic decision that can be implemented. Second, all relevant stakeholders must be willing to participate in and trust the process. Third, involvement of key stakeholders

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<sup>10</sup> <http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/>

must not put them at risk, especially in post-conflict situations where peace and security institutions may not be fully developed.<sup>11</sup>

- **World Bank's Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Handbook**

Another important source of guidance for strategic conflict assessment is the 2005 "Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Handbook" prepared by the Conflict Prevention and Post-conflict Reconstruction Network of multilateral and bilateral donor organisations.<sup>12</sup> The Handbook provides sets of tools for conducting peace and conflict impact assessments and for identifying and designing conflict-sensitive options and programmes. The Profile Tools aim to strengthen understanding of the context, undercurrents and components of a particular conflict situation. The Profile Tools use Political, Economic, Social/Cultural, Security, and Regional/International Lenses. The Impact Tools support the assessment of the possible political, socio-economic, security. The Decision Tools aim to help practitioners implement possible response strategies.

- **World Bank Post-Conflict Fund (PCF)**

Established in 1997, the Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) of the World Bank enhances the Bank's 'ability to support countries in transition from conflict to sustainable peace and economic growth'. The Fund provides grants to a wide range of partners (institutions, nongovernmental organizations, United Nations agencies, transitional authorities, governments, and other civil society institutions).

During the 2005 fiscal year, the Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) was engaged in 37 conflict-affected countries. Between the 1998 and 2005 fiscal years, the PCF has approved more than USD 70 million<sup>13</sup>.

### **3.4 The Role of other Multilateral Institutions and Initiatives**

- **OECD DAC Fragile States Group**

The Group works to shape a consensus on how to design and implement policy approaches that are tailored to the specific needs of fragile states. It fosters coordination between bilateral donors and multilateral donor organisations in addressing the need to improve their engagement in fragile states.

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<sup>11</sup> Verheem Rob, et al. "Strategic Environmental Assessments: Capacity Building in Conflict-Affected Countries". Report prepared by the Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment for the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction United in the Social Development Department of the Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network of the World Bank. 2005, page 13. See: [www.worldbank.org/conflict](http://www.worldbank.org/conflict) (see "Publications" in the navigation menu)

<sup>12</sup> See: [www.cprnet.net](http://www.cprnet.net)

<sup>13</sup> See PCF Annual Report 2005

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTCPR/0..contentMDK:20698452~menuPK:1260916~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:407740,00.html>

- **NATO Disaster Response**

The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center is NATO's primary disaster relief unit. The EADRCC was created in 1998 and has provided assistance to countries such as Romania, Georgia and Bulgaria in face of massive flooding disasters, as well as to Portugal to deal with massive forest fires and to the US following the devastation of hurricane Katrina.

- **ENVSEC**

The Environment and Security Initiative is developing some promising projects in environmental peacemaking, e.g. in the Sava River Basin (former Yugoslavia).  
[Elaborate]

- **The Nile River Basin Initiative**

[Elaborate]

- **The Congo Basin Forest Partnership**

[Elaborate]

- **The Kimberly Certification Process for conflict diamonds<sup>14</sup>**

The Kimberley Process is a unique initiative by government authorities, the international diamond industry and NGOs to stem the flow of 'conflict diamonds' – rough diamonds which are used by rebel movements to finance wars against legitimate governments, and which have contributed to fuelling devastating conflicts in a number of countries in Africa.

The Kimberley Process began in May 2000 in Kimberley (South Africa) as an informal attempt by interested governments, NGOs and industry groups to come up with a practical way of ensuring that illicit diamonds cannot enter the legitimate diamond trade – and thus provide consumers with the confidence that the diamonds they buy are not tainted by having contributed to violent conflict and human rights abuses in their countries of origin.

The Kimberley Process certification scheme (KPCS) has been in operation since January 2003, and now has some 50 participants, including all major diamond producing, trading and processing countries. The European Community (EC), representing the EU as a whole, is a Participant in the KPCS. Within the EC, the KPCS is implemented by a Council Regulation, adopted on 20 December 2002.

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<sup>14</sup> Source: [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/kimb/intro/index.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/kimb/intro/index.htm)

See also: Assessment by the KP Working Group on Monitoring of the impact and effectiveness of the KPCS (submission for the three-year review of the KPCS) at: [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/kimb/docs/review\\_150206.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/kimb/docs/review_150206.pdf)

- **Okavango**  
[Elaborate]

### **3.4. Example of national initiatives – The United Kingdom**

- **The UK Post-conflict Unit**

The Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) was established in September 2004 as a joint DFID-FCO-MoD initiative. PCRU 's role is to provide the UK government and its partners with integrated assessment and planning, and operational expertise, to deliver better and more effective stabilisation programmes. Its work in Afghanistan focuses on supporting the integration and coordination of UK government policy and operations. PCRU facilitated the development of a Joint UK plan for the Helmand province: a major challenge is tackling the opium trade and the insecurity which it brings.

## **4. Policy Recommendations**

### **4.1. General recommendations:**

- States should lend strong political and financial support to the existing tools, initiatives and activities related to post-conflict recovery.
- States should be involved in decision making on assistance to countries in post-conflict situations, to give due attention to the environmental factor.
- MEPs and MPs should, in general, draw the attention of the other branches to this environment and security aspects involved in post conflict situations.

### **4.2. Recommendations especially related to post-conflict:**

#### **a. Recommendations concerning the assessment stage:**

Assessments of damage, root causes, conflict resources should examine pre-existing chronic environmental problems, future pressures on natural resources (also taking into account the preventive nature of some of those measures)

In particular, it is crucial to:

- draw the environmental linkages to conflict (definition of conflict resources)
- assess environmental impacts of conflicts
- look at pre-existing chronic environmental problems
- assess future pressures on natural resources
- build institutional capacities

It is important to integrate the latest technology of remote sensing/GIS in assessing the environmental impacts of conflicts and to monitor the changes during the post-conflict

rehabilitation phase. It is recommended to support initiatives such as GMES and to include representatives of GMES and of similar organisations in the post-conflict planning phase.

Assessment should also be seen as an important tool in understanding the causes of conflict and in analysing the role of exploiting natural resources in triggering the conflict. This offers the basis for sound management of natural resources.

Part of the rapid post-conflict efforts should go to building the capacities of post-conflict states to undertake proper environmental impact assessments. Capacity building should prepare environmental and local administrations to take a leading role in managing and overseeing conflict environmental impact assessment exercises and the environmental impacts of post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction.

#### **b. Recommendations concerning the responses to assessments:**

- Integrate environment and a sustainable development perspective into post-conflict development assistance and peacemaking interventions
- Promote and financially support **environmental peacemaking**

The environment can be a powerful tool for peace building. In many cases, focusing on environmental challenges can have the effect of uniting conflicting parties in the common cause of conflict prevention, peace building and reconciliation.

For example, UNEP's post-conflict work in the Mesopotamian Marshlands brought together Iranian and Iraqi authorities for the first time for 29 years. UNEP's work in assessing common environmental concerns in the occupied territories similarly enhanced confidence and trust-building between Israeli and Palestinian. This was also the case with UNEP's work on the Sistan wetlands, where cross-border water management united Afghani and Iranian actors and created a climate of trust within which other post-conflict issues could be resolved. (See Report of ES Symposium)

Other initiatives where environmental cooperation was used for peace-building and to enhance the reconciliation process include peace parks such as the K-2-Siachen Peace Park<sup>15</sup> at the borders between India and Pakistan; and joint river basin management such as the Nile Basin Initiative<sup>16</sup>.

- With regard to the **role of the military**, military-related resources should continue to be used to restore the environment destroyed by armed forces, including clearance of landmines and UXO, development of environmentally sound technology for the destruction of weapons, adequate monitoring of nbc weapons stocks, nuclear waste, missile fuel.

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<sup>15</sup> <http://www.uvm.edu/~envprog/k2peacepark.htm> see also <http://www.envirosecurity.org/conference/working/K2PeacePark.pdf>

<sup>16</sup> <http://www.nilebasin.org/>

There is also a need for joint operational planning to achieve better interaction of military and civilian operations in post-conflict and peace-building operations. The Civil-Military Cell within the EU Military Staff is one example for achieving better coherence. Along these lines, joint military-civilian training could further help in enhancing interaction and in fostering joint planning. The OSCE Operations Unit, for example, could provide expertise on field operations deployment<sup>17</sup>.

Peacekeeping troops must be prepared to work in a degraded environment, with usually lower environmental protection standards. There is a need to include a Rapid Environmental and Health Risk Assessment in the teams deployed in the field to assess which threats need to be tackled first and which resources need to be secured.

Peacekeeping forces should be trained and prepared to play a role in monitoring and/or managing conflict resources.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of troops and combatants should include environmental dimension. This is particularly important in countries and regions with natural resources where the reintegration phase of former combatants could include programmes on sustainable resource management.

- With regard to **institution and state-building** of post-conflict countries

Promote **institution and capacity building** for transparent and accountable management of resources, registration of property rights, management and sharing of benefits

#### ***Support institution and state building***

The role of the multilateral and donor community should be only seen as a supporter for state and institution building rather than a builder of new state authority and administration. Support and capacity building of post-conflict state institutions should include the support to build political, social, economic, justice and security institutions. Support and capacity building should aim at making these institutions self-sustained

Within the context of support the building the post-conflict state and its institutions, it is worth mentioning that ‘early privatisation and demands for a ‘minimal-state’ may well be counter-productive by holding back important funds needed to establish strong states and create employment, and may foster even more corruption and patronage’<sup>18</sup>

#### ***Support Judicial System and Transparency in resource management***

Support should also include the strengthening law enforcement and judicial system.

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<sup>17</sup> The Operations Unit in the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre acts as the primary point of co-ordination for operational planning within the OSCE Secretariat. The Unit provides the framework for the initial build-up and management of future field deployments, enhancements, downsizings and closures. It also ensures close co-ordination with international partner organizations on issues directly linked to operational activities.

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.wiltonpark.org/documents/conferences/WP725/pdfs/WP725.pdf>

This is crucial in countries with natural resources or suffering the resource curse. Enforcing law for sound management of natural resources plays an important role in preventing future conflicts on resources and the abuse of natural resources to fund conflicts.

‘Donor agencies and regional organizations need to design and support tools and strategies for more effective, equitable, and transparent systems of resource management by the government, while ensuring benefits for those civilians who are dependent on resource exploitation. Importantly, this should also include new regulations and legislation on corporate engagement in natural resource industries to minimize corruption and impede ‘rogue companies’ from undermining fragile peace’. (See Report Wilton Park Conference, 2003<sup>19</sup>)

One area is in to include environmental crime and environmental protection modules in the training of local police officers. The OSCE Police Academies, for example, can serve as an example for setting Police training facilities

### ***Support the Peacebuilding Commission***<sup>20</sup>

The EU and EU member states should support the newly formed Peacebuilding Commission. [See also Group C draft report]

- With regard to the **programmatic / project level** a number of recommendations can be made with respect to the level of funding and administering post-conflict rehabilitation projects:

### ***Funding – Aid***

Funding post-conflict projects and programmes should be seen as an incentive for peace building. Donors should consider offering significant aid to governments engaging in peace negotiations or completing them (See OECD, 1999<sup>21</sup>). The effects of ‘peace conditionality’ on reaching a peace agreement between warring factions or states are not always guaranteed as in the case of Sri Lanka. But ‘peace conditionality’ should be used as one among other tools when negotiating peace settlements.

It is recommended that International Finance Institutions should be included in the early stages of peace negotiations and peace settlements ‘to match the content of peace agreements with post-conflict economic recovery strategies.’ (See Wilton Park Conference, 2003)

Humanitarian assistance, however, should be always considered as a result of people’s needs, and ‘not of political messages to be sent to governments’. Politicisation of post-conflict aid could carry adverse effects on the livelihood of the population and especially the most vulnerable ones.

### ***Coherence*** [See also Group B draft report]

Coherence of post-conflict assistance and in funding post-conflict programmes is

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<sup>19</sup> <http://www.wiltonpark.org/documents/conferences/WP725/pdfs/WP725.pdf>

<sup>20</sup> <http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/>

<sup>21</sup> [http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/synth\\_fin.pdf](http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/synth_fin.pdf)

always sought but rarely considered ideal. Coherence should move beyond the mere coordination of initiatives or programmes to consider post-conflict assistance as a comprehensive policy for post-conflict rehabilitation and peace building. It is highly recommended that aid and non-aid agencies put together a coherent approach that would include in addition to aid: diplomacy, military relations, enforcing justice and trade.

### ***Accountability and Transparency of Aid***

Post-conflict reconstruction is a lucrative opportunity for corrupt persons in private and public sectors. This is often ‘marred by weak government structures, thriving black markets, a legacy of patronage, the sudden influx of donor funds, and the need to but the short-term support of former combatants’ (p.3).<sup>22</sup>

A mechanism should be installed to ensure the transparency of funding and management of post-conflict projects and programmes and to ensure that post-conflict aid goes to the neediest. The mechanism should clearly state to whom donors and managers of post-conflict projects are accountable. An important role, here, should be given to civil society organisations and to representatives of local communities.

In this context, information sharing should be ensured in post-conflict initiatives. Information sharing and making all documentation available to the public should not be on demand basis but organically included in these initiatives.

### ***Environmental impact***

Environmental impact assessment should be included in both short-term post-conflict rehabilitation efforts and in longer term reconstruction programmes. [Elaborate.]

- With regard to **local actors and the private sector**, when supporting a post-conflict rehabilitation, it is essential to adopt a bottom-up approach and to consider the role of local actors in post-conflict rehabilitation and in long term institutional building. Engaging with local actors creates a sense of ownership to the rehabilitation initiatives and ensures the continuity and sustainability of these initiatives.

Support to civil society organizations is also vital for holding governments accountable.

A checklist for local actors and local community engagement could be adopted in EU funded programmes and projects. See for example World Bank’s ‘Community-Driven Reconstruction as an Instrument in War-to-Peace Transitions’<sup>23</sup>

It is important to improve the access of civil society to environmental information cf. Aarhus), to provide for appropriately training for environmental management

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<sup>22</sup> See Transparency International (2005) Global Corruption Report 2005. London: Pluto Press & TI

<sup>23</sup> [http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/Community-drivenReconstructionasanInstrumentinWar-to-PeaceTransitions/\\$FILE/WP+No+7+aug21.pdf](http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/Community-drivenReconstructionasanInstrumentinWar-to-PeaceTransitions/$FILE/WP+No+7+aug21.pdf)

and empowerment, to promote corporate social responsibility in post-conflict situations, and promote transparency of public contracts related to reconstruction.

- With regard to the **EU institutional level**, the EU should continue to include environmental considerations within public administration reform programme. It should continue to stress as well on the need for green procurement. Environmental audits would be effective for evaluation of the impact of projects. It is also important to undertake awareness-raising for programme managers and those involved in post-conflict rehabilitation projects.